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DONATIONS--THE EFFECT OF A WILL UPON THE LEGAL USUFRUCT
CREATED BY ARTICLE 916 OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
Testator bequeathed his entire estate, which consisted solely
of community property, to his widow. This legacy was reduced
to the testator's disposable portion,' and each of his four children
was declared the owner of an undivided one-sixth interest in his
succession.2 No mention of a legal usufruct in favor of the sur-
viving spouses was made in either the will or the judgment of
possession. Suit was brought by the administratrix of the estate
of one of the children to recover the rental value of his undivided
interest in certain property from his co-heirs (including the
testator's widow) .4 The court of appeal affirmed the district
court, holding that rent was due. On certiorari, held, reversed.
The surviving spouse is entitled to the usufruct over the com-
munity property inherited by the children of the marriage when-
ever the testator has failed to dispose of his community estate
adversely to such usufruct. Since the testator's will did not de-
prive the widow of this usufruct, she, as usufructuary, is not
obligated to pay rent to the children for the use of their property.
Winsberg v. Winsberg, 223 La. 67, 96 So.2d 44 (1957).
The usufruct created by law in favor of the surviving spouse
was first enacted into Louisiana law in 18441 and was incor-
porated into the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as Article 916.
This article provides in part that the surviving spouse shall hold
the usufruct over the community property inherited by the chil-
dren of the marriage whenever the deceased spouse has "not dis-
posed by last will and testament of his or her share in the com-
munity."" Although it is clear that the surviving spouse is en-
titled to this usufruct when the deceased spouse has died intes-
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1493 (1870). Since the testator had more than three
children, his disposable portion was limited to one-third of his estate. Therefore,
the widow received one-third of the testator's estate in full ownership.
2. Ibid. Two-thirds of the testator's estate was distributed among his four
children, each child receiving one-sixth of his estate.
3. Id. art. 916. Generally see Oppenheim, The Usufruct of the Surviving
Spouse, 18 TUL. L. REV. 181 (1943).
4. The plaintiff is also the natural tutrix of the testator's granddaughter who
is entitled to inherit all of her father's undivided interest in the testator's succes-
sion.
5. La. Acts 1944, No. 152, § 2.
6. See note 3 aupra.
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tate7 some confusion has existed as to the survivor's right to
the usufruct when the decedent has left a will. In the early cases,8
the fact that the deceased spouse elected to prescribe the dis-
tribution of his estate by will precluded his survivor from en-
joying the usufruct. Typical of these cases is Forstall v. Forstall,9
decided in 1876, which presented a factual situation indistin-
guishable from that of the present case. The court held that, in
order for the surviving spouse to hold the usufruct over the
children's inheritance, she, as universal legatee, would have had
to renounce her legacy.' 0 After this renunciation, the testator's
estate would have been distributed in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Civil Code involving intestate successions; and the
surviving spouse would have been entitled to the usufruct over
the community property inherited by the children of the mar-
riage under Article 916 of the Louisiana Civil Code. However,
in Succession of Moore," decided twelve years later, the survivor
was awarded the usufruct even though the deceased spouse had
left a will. The decedent's will provided that his widow should
have the usufruct over all of his property and, in addition, should
have full ownership over the disposable portion of his estate.
The court held that the widow was entitled to the usufruct by
the operation of law under Article 916 rather than by the provi-
sion in the testator's will. 1 2 It announced the rule that the legal
usufruct would attach to the children's inheritance whenever
the deceased spouse had not disposed of his share in the com-
munity adversely to the survivor's usufruct. 18 Although the pro-
visions of the Forstall will were different from the provisions of
the Moore will,' 4 it should be noted that the Forstall rule denies
7. Succession of Russell, 208 La. 213, 23 So.2d 50 (1945) ; Kelley v. Kelley,
198 La. 338, 3 So.2d 641 (1941).
8. Ludowig v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 579 (1883) ; Succession of Schiller, 33 La.
Ann. 1 (1881) ; Forstall v. Forstall, 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876) ; Grayson v. Sanford,
12 La. Ann. 646 (1857). Cf. Matthews v. Matthews, 13 La. Ann. 197 (1858).
Usufruct was granted to the survivor in Succession of Maloney, 127 La. 913, 54
So. 146 (1911), but the court made it clear that the testator's will did not attempt
to dispose of his property situated in Louisiana.
9. 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876).
10. Id. at 199.
11. 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
12. For cases which stress the fact that the usufruct arises by the operation
of law rather than the testator's will, see Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La.
App. 1932) ; Succession of Brown, 94 So.2d 317 (La. App. 1957).
13. 40 La. Ann. 531, 537, 4 So. 460, 463 (1888).
14. The Forstal will gave everything to the widow. The Moore will gave the
widow a usufruct over all of the testator's property and full ownership over his
disposable portion. There seems to have been some feeling that the Forstall ease
and the Moore case were not inconsistent and that a confirmation of the usufruct
was required in the will to protect the widow's legal usufruct. See Winsberg v.
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the usufruct whenever the decedent has disposed of his share in
the community under a will, while the Moore rule denies the
usufruct only if the will contains a distribution which is adverse
to the usufruct.
Although subsequent cases would seem to indicate a prefer-
ence for the Moore rule,15 the conflict between the Forstall and
the Moore decisions was not presented to the court prior to the
instant case. The administratrix of the deceased child's estate
could not recover the rental value of his undivided interest in the
property if the testator's widow held the usufruct over the prop-
erty. Under the Forstall rule, the widow would not be entitled to
the usufruct because the deceased spouse had left a will provid-
ing for the distribution of his share in the community. Under
the Moore rule, however, the widow would be entitled to the
usufruct since there was nothing in the will which could be con-
sidered a distribution adverse to the legal usufruct. The court
applied the Moore rule, holding that the Moore case had in effect
overruled the Forstall decision. Therefore, the widow became the
usufructuary over the children's inheritance by the operation of
law and was entitled to use the property without paying rent to
the naked owners.
The granting of the usufruct to the survivor in the instant
case seems appropriate. Act 152 of 1844 created a new right in
the surviving spouse - the right to hold the usufruct over the
community property inherited by the children of the marriage
when the deceased spouse had not disposed of his share in the
community.' It would be inconsistent to deny the survivor this
right after the deceased spouse had evidenced an intention to
leave everything to the survivor. It is believed that the fact that
the surviving spouse was the testator's universal legatee justifies
this decision.
It is submitted that there is no conflict between the instant
Winsberg, 87 So.2d 362, 365 (La. App. 1956) ; Oppenheim, The Usufruct of the
Surviving Spouse, 18 TuL. L. REV. 181 (1943) Note, 7 TUL. L. REv. 603 (1933).
The instant case clearly dispels such an approach.
15. Succession of Glancy, 108 La. 414, 32 So. 356 (1902), involving a will
making a donation to a third party. The court allowed the usufruct in spite of the
will citing the "adverse disposition" rule of the Moore case. See also Succession of
Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911) ; Succession of Brown, 94 So.2d 317 (La.
App. 1957).
16. Before 1844, the surviving spouse had no right to the usufruct over the
children's inheritance. See Matchler v. Bank of Lafayette, 31 La. Ann. 120 (1879).
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decision and Article 1710 of the Louisiana Civil Code. That ar-
ticle prohibits a testator from imposing any burdens, such as a
usufruct, upon his children's legitime.17 Thus a donation of a
usufruct, the value of which exceeds the testator's disposable
portion, is not binding upon his forced heirs and is subject to
reduction under Article 1499 of the Louisiana Civil Code.18
However, the usufruct which is granted to the surviving spouse
arises by the operation of law under Article 916 rather than
the donation of the testator. Thus it is only the surviving spouse
who may hold a usufruct over the children's forced portion.
Under the rule of the instant case, the testament must con-
tain a distribution which is adverse to the survivor's usufruct
before the usufruct will be denied. The opinion does not indicate
which distributions might be considered "adverse distributions."
Clearly, a bequest which prohibits the usufruct would be an
adverse distribution. However, the failure of the testament spe-
cifically to deny the usufruct does not necessarily mean that the
usufruct will be granted. For example, suppose that a testator
bequeaths all of his property to his children in equal proportions.
Although the usufruct was not specifically denied in the testa-
ment, it could be said that, by the very nature of a donation to
the children, an adverse distribution had been made. In neither
the Moore case nor the instant case did the testator make a dona-
tion directly to his children. 19 Therefore, it is possible that a
bequest to a child might be considered a distribution which is
adverse to the survivor's usufruct. It is submitted that whether
or not an "adverse distribution" has been made can best be deter-
mined by an examination of the intent of the testator. An in-
vestigation of this intent, as expressed in the will, would aid the
court in determining whether or not the survivor's right to the
usufruct under Article 916 of the Civil Code has been denied by
the testament.
William H. Cook, Jr.
17. Clarkson v. Clarkson, 13 La. Ann. 422 (1858).
18. Under Article 1499 the forced heirs of the testator have the right to sur-
render to the legatee full ownership of the testator's disposable portion in place of
his usufruct. See also Article 1752 of the Civil Code which provides special rules
for the reduction of a donation made by a testator to his second wife. Succession
of Braswell, 142 La. 948, 77 So. 886 (1918).
19. See note 14 8upra.
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